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RCPO v C

23 June 2010

A solicitor was cleared of six counts of money laundering in January of this year, after a judge ruled that a fair trial was impossible due to delays in bringing the prosecution.

According to the judge, the 'undue delay had created incurable prejudice in an examination of the respondent's case'.

The background

The respondent, C, a solicitor and equity partner was the firm's nominated money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) during the time that a client, Amer Munir, had laundered fraudulently obtained money through the firm's client account.

Munir was convicted on six counts and acquitted on five in December 2006, for his role in the money laundering. The jury disagreed on a further three counts.

The prosecution alleged that between September 2001 and 19 March 2004 , C knew or suspected that the purpose of the transactions undertaken by Munir was to acquire, retain, use or control criminal property.

C's professional obligation was to report to the then National Criminal Intelligence Service or other appropriate authorities any suspicious transactions involving the firm's client account.

No such reports were made by C during the period 2001 to 2004.

C was arrested and interviewed on 29 April 2004 . He gave full answers to the questions put based upon documentary evidence obtained in the course of the enquiry. A second interview took place on 18 January 2005 after which C was released without charge.

No further steps were taken in the prosecution of C until January 2008 when he was summonsed for alleged money laundering offences.

What the prosecution had to prove

In the case against C, the court confirmed that the prosecution would have to prove:

  • the monies passing through the client account were in fact Munir's proceeds of crime;
  • that C was involved in the arrangements and transactions alleged; and
  • that at the time C knew or suspected that their purpose was to acquire, retain, use or control criminal property by or on behalf of Munir.

The prosecution would be able to rely on Munir's convictions for some of the charges against C. However, in relation to the transactions where Munir had been acquitted or the jury had been unable to reach a verdict, they would have to prove the fact that the funds were the proceeds of crime.

During the hearing, the recollections of the employees and members of C's firm as to the fact and degree of C's participation were at issue. C also claimed he was unsure of the detail surrounding the transactions in which he was implicated.

The court held that the case could not depend wholly on documents since no single document referred to the deals in question conclusively. While inferences could be drawn from some documents about C's involvement and the level of knowledge or suspicion he had, there were a number of other factors to undermine the strength of this evidence. These included the fact that:

  1. there were at least two other people in the firm with connections to Munir quite apart from the defendant, who could have dealt with the transactions and not given C all of the relevant information; and
  2. two bank managers had provided written references for Munir recommending him as a client, which the jury may have considered relevant in deciding whether C was complicit in the fraud or duped.

The Finding

The court agreed with the trial judge's ruling, that because the case depended on the recollection of individual witnesses of events up to eight years previously, for these critical issues, a fair trial was not possible.

The undue delay had created incurable prejudice in an examination of the respondent's case and to proceed would be an abuse of the process of the court. The prosecution was refused leave to appeal the trial judge's ruling.

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